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The Pandemic Crisis Shows that the World Remains Trapped in a “Global Doom Loop”
of Financial Instability, Rising Debt Levels, and Escalating Bailouts
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.*
August 6, 2021
In January 2020, I completed a book analyzing the financial crises that precipitated the
Great Depression of the 1930s and the recent Great Recession. My book argued that the world’s
financial system was caught in a “global doom loop” at the beginning of 2020. Bailouts and
economic stimulus programs during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC) had
imposed heavy debt burdens on most governments, and leading central banks were carrying
bloated balance sheets. The rescues arranged by governments and central banks during the GFC
created a widely-shared expectation that they would continue to intervene to ensure the stability
of major financial institutions and important financial markets. That expectation encouraged
speculative risk-taking by financial institutions and investors as well as dangerous growth in
private and public debts. I warned that the global doom loop was planting the seeds for the
“next” financial crisis, which could overwhelm the already strained resources of governments
and central banks.1
The “next” global crisis began only two months later, in March 2020. The rapid spread
of the Covid-19 pandemic caused governments in most developed countries to shut down large
sectors of their economies and impose social distancing mandates. Many thousands of
businesses closed, setting off a downward spiral in economic activity that paralyzed global
financial markets. Investors, businesses, and financial institutions “scrambled for cash” and
engaged in panicked “fire sales” of financial assets. Governments and central banks in the U.S.,
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United Kingdom (U.K.), European Union (EU), and other advanced economies adopted fiscal
stimulus measures and financial rescue programs with a size, scope, and speed that far surpassed
the emergency actions taken during the GFC.
The pandemic financial crisis and the extraordinary responses of governments and central
banks demonstrate that policymakers have not addressed the root causes of the GFC. Major
financial institutions and financial markets remain highly unstable. They continue to underwrite
rapidly rising levels of private and public debts based on their shared expectation of future
government bailouts. Governments and central banks have expanded their “safety nets” far
beyond banks and now protect their entire financial systems, including short-term wholesale
credit markets, systemically important nonbanks, and the corporate bond market. As a practical
matter, governments and central banks have “bankified” their financial systems, thereby
undermining market discipline, stimulating dangerous asset bubbles, and increasing social
inequality.
Our financial system must be reformed so that it no longer promotes unsustainable
booms, fueled by reckless growth in private debts, followed by destructive busts that require
massive bailouts and vast increases in government debts. My recent book provides a blueprint
for needed reforms, including a new Glass-Steagall Act. A new Glass-Steagall Act would break
up financial giants by separating banks from the capital markets and by prohibiting nonbanks
from financing their operations with functional substitutes for bank deposits. A new GlassSteagall Act would establish a financial system that is more stable, more competitive, and more
responsive to the needs of consumers, communities, and business firms. Properly implemented,
a new Glass-Steagall Act would provide the most direct and practical way to break the global
doom loop and end the toxic boom-and-bust cycles of the past quarter century.

2

Analysis
1.

Credit Booms and Bailouts Produced Rapid Increases in Private and Public Debts
Before and After the Global Financial Crisis
Massive credit booms occurred on both sides of the Atlantic during the two decades that

preceded the GFC. In the U.S., private debts doubled from $10.4 trillion to $20.4 trillion
between 1991 and 1999, and they doubled again to reach $41.6 trillion in 2007. U.S. private
debts as a percentage of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 169% in 1991 to
212% in 1999 and 288% in 2007. The peak of the U.S. credit boom in 2007 topped the previous
record for private-sector debts (250% of GDP) at the onset of the Great Depression in 1930-31.2
A credit surge of comparable magnitude occurred in the U.K. and several other European
countries, including Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. U.K. private debts as a percentage of U.K.
GDP skyrocketed from 90% in 1987 to 200% in 1999 and over 400% in 2007. In 2008, private
debt levels exceeded 200% of GDP in Ireland and Spain and 175% of GDP in Portugal. The
GFC had its most devastating impact in countries that experienced the largest credit booms.3
Two categories of financial institutions played central roles in promoting the
Transatlantic credit boom of the 1990s and 2000s. Commercial banks became “universal banks”
in the U.S. and Europe as policymakers authorized banks to engage in capital markets activities.
Nonbank financial institutions – including securities broker-dealers, consumer finance
companies, hedge funds, and private equity firms – became “shadow banks” as governments
allowed them to finance their operations by issuing financial claims that were payable in practice
at par (100% of face value) either on demand or within a very short period. Those short-term
financial claims – including money market funds, commercial paper, and securities repurchase
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agreements (repos) – served as functional substitutes for bank deposits and became “shadow
deposits.”
Universal banks and shadow banks led the way in financing the explosive growth of
subprime home mortgages and other risky consumer debts on both sides of the Atlantic. Both
types of institutions bundled hazardous mortgages and consumer loans into asset-backed
securities (ABS), which were sold as “safe” assets to investors around the world. Universal
banks and shadow banks used the “financial alchemy” of securitization – with the help of highlycompensated credit ratings agencies – to transform high-risk loans into highly-rated ABS.
Policymakers actively encouraged those developments because they viewed the expansion of
consumer credit as the best way to support household spending at a time when many middleincome and lower-income families were experiencing stagnant or declining incomes.4
Government debts also expanded during the 1990s and early 2000s, albeit at a somewhat
slower pace than private-sector debts. U.S. federal, state and local government debts increased
from $4.9 trillion in 1991 to $7.0 trillion in 1999 and $12.2 trillion in 2007. Total U.S. private
and public debts reached $53.8 trillion in 2007, equal to 366% of U.S. GDP. On a global basis,
government debts rose from $22 trillion to $34 trillion between 2000 and 2007. During the same
period, worldwide private and public debts increased from $84 trillion (225% of global GDP) to
$167 trillion (275% of global GDP). Consequently, both the U.S. and the rest of the world
confronted an enormous debt overhang problem when the GFC began in 2007. Widespread
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defaults by consumers, businesses, and financial institutions triggered systemic financial crises in
the U.S., U.K., and Europe.5
Governments and central banks responded to the GFC with unprecedented levels of
support for their economies and financial systems. Most developed countries adopted large
fiscal stimulus programs, resulting in significant increases in government debt burdens.6 Many
governments and central banks also supported their financial institutions and financial markets
with emergency loans, capital infusions, asset purchases, and financial guarantees. In the U.S.,
the total outstanding amount of emergency assistance to financial institutions and markets
peaked at almost $7 trillion in early 2009. EU governments provided nearly €5 trillion of state
aid to their financial institutions and markets, and the EU narrowly avoided a catastrophic
sovereign debt crisis.7
Four leading central banks – the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Bank of England (BoE), the
Bank of Japan (BOJ), and the European Central Bank (ECB) – adopted ultra-low interest rate
policies that resulted in near-zero or negative short-term interest rates. They also established
“quantitative easing” (QE) programs that involved vast purchases of government bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and other assets. Ultra-low interest rates and QE programs pushed
down short-term and longer-term interest rates for the debts of governments, households,
businesses, and financial institutions, thereby reducing government budget deficits as well as
borrowing and debt service costs for public and private obligors. The Fed’s balance sheet grew
from $900 billion in August 2008 to $4.5 trillion in December 2016. During the same period, the
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combined balance sheets of the Fed, BoE, BoJ, and ECB expanded from $4 trillion to $15
trillion. As a percentage of home country GDP, the balance sheets of the four central banks
increased from 6% to 23% in the U.S. and U.K., 14% to 34% in the Eurozone, and 20% to 88%
in Japan.8
In 2009, the Group of 20 (G20) nations agreed on a series of reforms to their financial
systems to address the causes of the GFC. The G20’s reform agenda focused mainly on
technical improvements in financial regulation, including stronger capital and liquidity
requirements for banks. However, the G20 did not advocate fundamental changes to the precrisis structure of financial institutions and financial markets. Consequently, the G20 left in
place the universal banks and shadow banks that financed the credit boom of the 2000s.
Moreover, the massive bailouts provided to universal banks and shadow banks during the GFC
helped those institutions to become even larger and more dominant players in global financial
markets after 2009.9
Universal banks and shadow banks underwrote another major expansion of private and
public debts between 2009 and 2019. Universal banks provided large amounts of credit to
shadow banks, and both types of financial institutions relied on short-term funding from money
market funds, commercial paper, and repos as well as longer-term financing from capital
markets. The lax credit policies of universal banks and shadow banks allowed private debts
owed by U.S. households, nonfinancial businesses, and financial institutions to reach new all-

Id. at 293-97, 321-22; Atlantic Council, Global QE Tracker (Dec. 1, 2020) (“Cumulative Balance Sheets – Fed,
BoJ, ECB, and BoE”) [hereinafter Global QE Tracker],
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-qe-tracker/; Paolo Cavallino & Fiorella De Fiore,
“Central banks’ response to Covid-19 in advanced economies,” BIS Bulletin No. 21 (June 5, 2020), at 6 (Graph 3),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull21.pdf; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, MO, “FRED Economic Data: [Federal
Reserve] Assets: Total Assets” (Updated July 29, 2021) [hereinafter FRED Fed Balance Sheet Data],
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL;
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time records at the end of 2019. Public debts also set new records as federal, state, and local
governments borrowed heavily to mitigate the economic impact of the Great Recession. U.S.
private debts increased from $41.6 trillion to $48.9 trillion between 2007 and 2019, while
federal, state, and local government obligations more than doubled, rising from $12.1 trillion to
$26.3 trillion. The total U.S. debt burden of $75.2 trillion topped 350% of GDP in 2019, not far
below its record level of 366% in 2007.10
Global debt levels followed the same pattern of relentless growth after the GFC.
Worldwide private and public debts expanded from $167 trillion (275% of global GDP) in 2007
to $253 trillion (322% of global GDP) in 2019. Worldwide government debts in 2019 reached
their highest level as a percentage of global GDP since World War II. Leading central banks
supported the rapid growth of global private and public debts by extending their QE asset
purchase programs and enlarging their balance sheets.11
U.S. and international policymakers expressed growing concerns about those rising debt
levels, especially in the case of nonfinancial business firms. At the end of 2019, a majority of
outstanding U.S. and global corporate bonds were rated either at or below the lowest investment
grade (BBB), as investors chose to buy riskier bonds with higher yields in a world of ultra-low
interest rates. In addition, most non-investment-grade corporate bonds and leveraged loans to
businesses contained very weak covenants that allowed high levels of corporate leverage and
provided few protections to investors. Officials warned that mutual funds and other investment
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funds holding risky corporate debts would be exposed to large losses as well as potential “runs”
by investors if a serious recession occurred.12
In 2017 and 2018, the Fed and some other central banks tried to “normalize” their
monetary policies and to restrain the growth of debt by adopting a policy of “quantitative
tightening” (QT). The Fed raised its short-term interest rate target seven times and reduced the
size of its balance sheet from $4.5 trillion to less than $4 trillion. The BoE approved an increase
in its short-term interest rate target, and the ECB stopped buying government bonds. Those
moves by central banks toward a policy of QT frightened investors and caused a major sell-off of
higher-risk assets in global financial markets during the fourth quarter of 2018.
The market turmoil in late 2018 alarmed the Fed and other central banks, and they
abandoned their QT efforts. The Fed stopped raising interest rates in January 2019, and it
approved three quarter-point reductions in its short-term interest rate target during the second
half of 2019. The Fed also expanded its balance sheet by more than $400 billion during the fall
of 2019 by purchasing short-term Treasury bills and providing Treasury-backed repo loans. The
Fed’s decision to expand its balance sheet followed a sudden and unexpected liquidity squeeze in
the Treasury repo market in September. The Fed effectively acted as “market maker of last
resort” after its primary dealers – including the biggest U.S. universal banks – refused to act as
lenders to many borrowers that wanted to roll over their repo loans.13
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The ECB and other central banks joined the Fed in easing their monetary policies during
2019. The dramatic “U-turn” by the Fed and other central banks in 2019 continued their decadelong policy of using “unconventional monetary policies in a world awash in debt” to prevent
financial disruptions that might undermine the broader economy.14
As I argued in my recent book, “The coordinated easing of monetary policy by central
banks in 2019 confirms that policymakers have not resolved the systemic problems in financial
markets that led to the financial crisis of 2007-09. The same interlocking system of universal
banks and shadow banks remains in place, and that system continues to inflate a global debt
bubble comparable to the one that burst in 2007.” I warned that “post-crisis regulatory and
monetary policies have produced a fragile and volatile global financial system, which depends on
continuous infusions of central bank liquidity to support universal banks, large shadow banks,
and the capital markets.” Those policies created a “global doom loop, in which governments,
central banks, universal banks, shadow banks, and capital markets are locked together in a
dangerous web of mutual dependence.” I predicted that the global doom loop was “likely to
trigger a future financial crisis that will be even more devastating than the last one.”15 The crisis
that swept through global financial markets in March 2020 indicated that my diagnosis was
correct.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/what-happened-in-money-markets-in-september-201920200227.htm.
14
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15
Id. at 324-27.
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2.

A Second Series of Huge Bailouts Occurred during the Pandemic Crisis, Resulting
in Extremely High Levels of Private and Public Debts
The Covid-19 pandemic was “the most devastating shock to hit the global economy since

the Second World War.”16 Most developed countries responded to the pandemic with mandatory
shutdowns and social distancing orders that forced thousands of businesses to close, thereby
inflicting vast losses on business owners and employees. Despite unprecedented government
stimulus programs and enormous infusions of central bank liquidity, global GDP declined by
3.4% in 2020. Average GDP levels in advanced economies dropped by 4.7%, including declines
of 3.5% in the U.S., 9.9% in the U.K., 6.6% in the Eurozone, and 4.8% in Japan. Unemployment
rates increased and labor participation rates dropped sharply. The U.S. lost 22 million jobs
during March and April 2020, and the nation’s unemployment rate rose to 14.7%, the highest
level recorded since the Great Depression. Minorities, employees of small businesses, and
younger, less-educated, and lower-skilled workers suffered the most severe job losses.17
The rapid spread of the pandemic in February and March 2020 and government shutdown
mandates set off a contagious financial panic, which paralyzed global financial markets. The
S&P 500 index fell by 34% between February 19 and March 23, 2020, including the largest
single-day decline (12% on March 16) since the 1987 stock market crash. Average equity prices
in other advanced economies also dropped by a third during the same period. Investors engaged
in a “scramble for cash,” including runs on money market funds and corporate bond funds.

16

Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report 2020, at 1 (June 2020) [hereinafter June 2020 BISAEO], https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2020e.pdf.
17
Id. at ix-xiv, 1-9; Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report 2021, at 1-7 (June 2021)
[hereinafter June 2021 BIS-AEO], https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2021e.pdfInternational Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook, at 1-9, 43-47 (April 2021), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/03/23/worldeconomic-outlook-april-2021; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Semiannual Monetary Policy
Report 5-9, 24-26, 35-36 (June 12, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Fed Monetary Policy Report],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20210709_mprfullreport.pdf;

10

Markets froze for most government bonds and nearly all private debts, including commercial
paper, repos, corporate bonds, and leveraged loans. Credit ratings agencies downgraded more
than $1 trillion of corporate bonds between March and May 2020, and credit spreads for higherrisk debt securities rose to their highest levels since 2008. Big universal banks were either
unable or unwilling to act as dealers and market makers for a broad range of financial
instruments, including repos, mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, and exchange-traded
funds holding corporate debt. Many foreign banks and other foreign borrowers could not obtain
funding in dollars to satisfy their dollar-denominated obligations.18
Market conditions stabilized only after governments and central banks around the world
established a wide array of emergency facilities to support financial institutions and financial
markets, supplemented by massive fiscal stimulus programs. The size, scope, and speed of
governmental responses to the pandemic crisis far surpassed the emergency measures adopted
during the GFC. Congress approved $5.2 trillion of fiscal stimulus programs between March
2020 and March 2021 – a response that was four times as large as U.S. fiscal stimulus measures

Sirio Aramonte & Fernando Avalos, “The recent distress in corporate bonds markets: cues from ETFs,” BIS
Bulletin No. 6 (April 14, 2020), at 1-5 (quote at 3), https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull06.pdf; June 2020 BIS-AEO,
supra note 16, at 9-18 (including Graphs 1.7 & 1.8), 39-47; 2020 Fed Monetary Policy Report, supra note 17, at 1618, 27-34, 37-41; Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2020 Annual Report 3-8, 13-29, 35-45, 99-106, 110-11,
117-20, 128-35, 167-69, 174-75, 178-79 (Dec. 2020) [hereinafter 2020 FSOC Annual Report],
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2020AnnualReport.pdf; see also Craig A. Chikis & Jonathan
Goldberg, “Dealer Inventory Constraints in the Corporate Bond Market during the COVID Crisis,” FEDS Notes
(July 15, 2021) (showing that available liquidity for corporate bonds fell by more than 40% during the early stages
of the pandemic crisis, due in part to significant reductions in bond inventories held by large bank dealers),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/dealer-inventory-constraints-in-the-corporate-bondmarket-during-the-covid-crisis-20210715.htm; Ryan Clements, “Exchange-Traded Confusion: How Industry
Practices Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange-Traded Funds,” 15:2 Virginia Law & Business Review 121,
134-38 (2021) (discussing failures by large bank dealers to act as market makers (“account parties”) in March 2020
after secondary market prices for bond ETFs dropped far below their designated net asset values); Justin Baer, “The
Day Coronavirus Nearly Broke the Financial Markets,” Wall Street Journal (May 20, 2020) (describing the systemic
panic that occurred in financial markets on March 16, 2020, including refusals by big banks to act as dealers in
markets for debt securities), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-day-coronavirus-nearly-broke-the-financial-markets11589982288.
18

11

during the Great Recession of 2007-09.19 During the same period, the U.S. and other
governments around the world adopted pandemic stimulus programs totaling $16 trillion, which
provided “extraordinary support to the balance sheets of firms and households.”20
Central banks responded with emergency lending and guarantee programs that stabilized
financial institutions and financial markets, thereby ensuring “market functioning and access to
credit” and preventing “widespread financial turmoil.” Many governments provided fiscal
backstops to support the lending and guarantee programs of their central banks. Central banks
also maintained ultra-low interest rates and purchased vast quantities of government bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and other assets “to reduce the costs of raising and servicing private
and public debt.” A high degree of coordination between governments and central banks meant
that “fiscal and monetary policy supported each other in the pursuit of macroeconomic
stability.”21
Large-scale asset purchases by the Fed, BoE, BoJ, and ECB expanded their balance
sheets from $15 trillion to $25 trillion between January 2020 and June 2021. During the same
period, their balance sheets as a percentage of home country GDP increased from 19% to 34%
for the Fed, 27% to 43% for the BoE, 38% to 61% for the ECB, and 104% to 131% for the
BoJ.22

Christina D. Romer, “The Fiscal Policy Response to the Pandemic” (Mar. 25, 2021), at 1-2, 8-15 & Table 1,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BPEASP21_Romer_conf-draft_updated.pdf.
20
Dario Caldara et al., “The Global Recovery: Lessons from the Past,” FEDS Notes (June 22, 2021) (quote),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-global-recovery-lessons-from-the-past-20210622.htm;
Kristalina Georgieva, “Giving People a Fair Shot – Policies to Secure the Recovery” (speech by IMF Managing
Director on Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/25/sp033021-SMs2021-Curtain-Raiser;
2020 BIS-AEO, supra note 16, at 11-12, 22-29 & Chapter II; 2020 Fed Monetary Policy Report, supra note 17, at 24, 19-22, 42-52.
21
Caldara et al., supra note 20 (first two quotes); Cavallino & De Fiore, supra note 8 (last two quotes); June 2020
BIS-AEO, supra note 16, at 22-23 & Chapter II; Financial Stability Board, Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank
Financial Intermediation 2020, at 59-63, 67-75 (Dec. 16, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 FSB Shadow Banking Report],
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161220.pdf.
22
Ritvik Carvalho & Tommy Wilkes, “Global liquidity is shrinking and that’s no bad thing,” Reuters (May 20,
2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/global-markets-cenbank-analysis-2021-05-20/; Cavallino & De Fiore,
19
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Like other major central banks, the Fed quickly revived almost all of the crisis
management tools it established during the GFC. The Fed approved a near-zero short-term
interest rate target, provided emergency loans to banks and securities broker-dealers, and
restored crisis-era programs that provided blanket guarantees for short-term wholesale financial
markets (including money market funds, commercial paper, and repos) as well as markets for
asset-backed securities. The Fed supercharged its QE program by pledging to buy unlimited
amounts of Treasury bonds and federal agency mortgage-backed securities. The Fed’s QE
purchases expanded its balance sheet from $4.3 trillion on March 11, 2020, to $7.2 trillion on
June 10, 2020, and $8.2 trillion on July 14, 2021. The Fed also stabilized overseas dollar
funding markets by opening swap lines with more than a dozen foreign central banks.23
In addition, the Fed established a series of novel lending programs, with supporting
guarantees from the U.S. Treasury under the CARES Act. The Fed’s new programs provided
financing for (1) loans made by banks to small businesses under the Paycheck Protection
Program, (2) loans made by banks to midsized businesses under the Main Street Lending
Program, and (3) purchases of state and local government bonds under the Municipal Liquidity
Facility. The Fed also established the Primary and Secondary Corporate Market Credit Facilities
with the Treasury’s backing. Those two programs authorized the Fed to buy investment-grade

supra note 8, at 6 (Graph 3); Global QE Tracker, supra note 8 (“Cumulative Balance Sheets” &“Balance Sheets as a
Percentage of GDP” graphs); Edward Yardeni & Mali Quintana, Central Banks: Monthly Balance Sheets (July 23,
2021), at 1 (Figure 1) & 3 (Figure 5), https://www.yardeni.com/pub/peacockfedecbassets.pdf.
23
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Semiannual Monetary Policy Report 39-41, 46-47 (July 9,
2021) [hereinafter 2021 Fed Monetary Policy Report],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20210709_mprfullreport.pdf; 2020 Fed Monetary Policy
Report, supra note 17, at 43-52; FRED Fed Balance Sheet Data, supra note 8; Jeffrey Cheng et al., “What’s the Fed
doing in response to the Covid-19 crisis? What more could it do?” (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19/; Marc Labonte, “The Federal Reserve’s Response to
COVID-19: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service (No. R46411, updated Feb. 8, 2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46411; Lev Menand, “The Federal Reserve and the 2020 Economic
and Financial Crisis” (European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper No. 518/2020, May 2021),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3602740.
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and non-investment-grade corporate bonds – either directly from corporate issuers or in the
secondary market – as well as bond ETFs. The Fed bought almost $14 billion of corporate bonds
and bond ETFs, and the Fed also financed more than $16 billion of loans to midsized companies.
In addition, the Fed pledged to buy up to $750 billion of corporate bonds to stabilize the
corporate bond market.24
The Fed’s ultra-low interest rates and its unprecedented support for the corporate bond
market “allow[ed] investment grade firms to issue new debt at historically low yields.”25 As one
Wall Street insider explained, the Fed “essentially told the world that there is now a backstop on
corporate debt . . . . By directly intervening [in the corporate bond market, the Fed] has
established a precedent that will be impossible to reverse. . . . We have now socialized credit
risk.”26
The Fed’s massive backstop for corporate debt enabled U.S. companies to issue $2.5
trillion of bonds in 2020, “the largest [U.S.] corporate borrowing spree on record.” U.S.
nonfinancial business debts rose by more than 9% during 2020 and set a new record of $17.7
trillion at the end of the year. Generous support programs for business loans in the U.S. and
many other countries enabled corporations around the world to issue $5.35 trillion of bonds in

24

Michael Barr, Howell Jackson & Margaret Tahyar, The Financial Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic 1-15
(Aug. 1, 2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3666461; Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Financial
Stability Report 9-14, 32-34, 49-52 (Nov. 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financialstability-report-20201109.pdf; Cheng et al., supra note 23; Labonte, supra note 23; Menand, supra note 23; 2020
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2020, a “record borrowing binge.” Global nonfinancial corporate debts increased by over 12%
during 2020 and reached $85.2 trillion at the end of the year.27
Government fiscal stimulus programs and central bank QE purchases also supported
large increases in debt levels for governments, households, and financial institutions. In
December 2020, government debts in the U.S. and worldwide climbed to their highest levels
since World War II as a percentage of U.S. and global GDP.28 U.S. private and public debts
increased by 10% to $82.7 trillion during 2020 and reached 385% of U.S. GDP – eclipsing the
previous record of 366% in 2007. Similarly, global private and public debts rose by over 12%
during 2020 and set a new record of $290.6 trillion, equal to 359% of global GDP.29
Thus, governments and central banks took extraordinary steps to contain the financial and
economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Governments and central banks repeated and
expanded their emergency responses to the GFC. Both crises demonstrated the willingness of

Nikou Asgari & Joe Rennison, “ Corporate debt sales to shrivel in 2021 after record boom,” Financial Times
(Dec. 31, 2020) (second quote), https://www.ft.com/content/8ec279bf-fada-42ee-9a8e-86349a53efc8; Joe Rennison,
“Fed backstop masks rising risks in America’s corporate debt market,” Financial Times (Dec. 22, 2020) (first
quote), https://www.ft.com/content/7fa7e230-5a8f-4a65-b8b7-ecd603a2a3d1; see also 2021 Fed Flow of Funds
Data, supra note 10, at 7 (Table D.3); Puneet Wadhwa, “Global debt rises $32 trillion in 2020 amid Covid
pandemic,” Business Standard (June 8, 2021), https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/global-debtrises-32-trillion-in-2020-amid-covid-pandemic-moody-s-121060800412_1.html.
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for International Finance, Global Debt Monitor (May 13, 2021) [hereinafter 2021 IIF Global Debt Monitor],
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governments and central banks to adopt unprecedented and wide-ranging policies to stabilize
financial institutions and financial markets and prevent a second Great Depression.
The colossal responses to the GFC and the pandemic crisis went far beyond the
traditional “safety net” that governments and central banks previously provided to banks. From
the 1950s through the early 1990s, governments and central banks in developed countries usually
protected most depositors (especially retail depositors) and frequently rescued large banks that
were considered “too big to fail” (TBTF). However, most governments and central banks during
that period believed that nonbank financial institutions and business firms fell outside the
“regulatory perimeter” and were not proper subjects for government bailouts or “lender of last
resort” assistance from central banks.
Government “safety nets” expanded dramatically during both the GFC and the pandemic
crisis. In addition to bailing out TBTF banks during the GFC, governments and central banks
rescued short-term wholesale credit markets and systemically important shadow banks (including
large securities broker-dealers and insurance companies) as well as a few big commercial
enterprises (e.g., General Electric and General Motors). During 2020, governments and central
banks went even further by protecting all of the financial institutions and markets they rescued in
2008 and by supporting the corporate bond market and many nonfinancial business firms.30
On July 28, 2021, the Fed took another fateful step by creating permanent “backstops in
money markets” to ensure “smooth market functioning.” The Fed established “standing”
facilities that will offer repo loans (collateralized by Treasury or federal agency securities) to

30

For discussions of changes in bailout policies between 1990 and 2020, see Cavallino & De Fiore, supra note 8;
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U.S. and foreign megabanks and foreign central banks. The Fed’s new standing repo facilities
received enthusiastic support from leading architects of the bailouts during the GFC, including
Timothy Geithner, Lawrence Summers, and William Dudley. New York Fed President John
Williams said the new facilities would “help calm markets in times of stress by giving financial
firms confidence they will have easy access to liquidity.” The Fed’s announcement of its new
permanent “backstops” did not include any analysis of the potential future costs of providing
“easy access to liquidity” for megabanks – including the costs of expanding their TBTF subsidies
and increasing their incentives to take even greater risks at the public’s expense.31
I have previously argued that governments and central banks “bankified” global financial
markets in 2008 and 2020 by extending the traditional “safety net” for banks to rescue short-term
wholesale credit markets, shadow banks, and the corporate bond market.32 The costs of
“bankifying” financial markets have been immense, as governments are now saddled with huge
debt burdens and central banks are weighed down by bloated balance sheets. As shown below,
“bankifying” financial markets has greatly expanded the universe of financial claims that are
supported by explicit and implicit government subsidies, and it has also entrenched the TBTF
status of universal banks and large shadow banks.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Press Release: Statement Regarding Repurchase
Agreements” (July 28, 2021) (first three quotes),
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markets,” Reuters (July 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-standing-repo/update-1-fed-establishesstanding-repo-facilities-to-support-money-markets-idUSL1N2P42C4; Colby Smith, “US Treasury market needs
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3.

Repeated Rescues of Shadow Deposit Markets Have Encouraged the Growth of
Existing and New Types of Shadow Deposits
In 2008 and 2020, governments and central banks bailed out money market funds,

commercial paper, and repos as if they were bank deposits. Those bailouts fulfilled expectations
by investors that “shadow deposits” – short-term financial instruments (STFIs) that are
functional substitutes for bank deposits – would receive governmental support during financial
crises to ensure repayment at par (100% of face value). The bailouts of 2008 and 2020 have
stimulated further growth in existing shadow deposit markets. They have also encouraged
financial technology companies (“fintechs”) to introduce new types of shadow deposits that
create comparable systemic risks, including the likelihood of future government bailouts.
a.

The continued growth of existing types of shadow deposits

Since the GFC, wholesale credit markets have generated rising volumes of STFIs that are
functional substitutes for bank deposits. The largest categories of shadow deposits – money
market funds, commercial paper, and repos – played central roles in the GFC, as investor runs on
those instruments destabilized financial markets and caused the failures or near-failures of
numerous large banks and shadow banks.33
“Prime” money market funds invest in STFIs issued by private-sector firms, including
commercial paper, repos, and bank certificates of deposit (CDs). Prime money market funds
offer to redeem shares held by retail investors at a fixed net asset value (NAV) equal to their
purchase price of $1 per share, thereby providing deposit-like treatment. “Government” money
market funds invest in short-term government securities and redeem their shares at fixed NAVs
for both retail and institutional investors.

33
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Short-term commercial paper and repos provide repayment at par and offer the same
appearance of immediate liquidity to institutional investors. Money market funds, commercial
paper, and repos are shadow deposits because they compete with bank deposits as vehicles for
short-term savings and liquidity. Shadow banks – including securities broker-dealers, private
equity funds, hedge funds, and nonbank finance companies – rely on shadow deposits as sources
of short-term funding to finance their longer-term loans and credit guarantees, which compete
with the credit services of chartered banks.34
Money market funds are among the largest investors in bank CDs as well as commercial
paper and repos. Money market funds are major sources of short-term funding for universal
banks, shadow banks, and nonfinancial business firms. As a result, serious disruptions affecting
money market funds are likely to destabilize the financial system and the general economy, as
shown during the GFC and the pandemic crisis.35
The bailouts of 2008 and 2020 have encouraged the continued growth of shadow deposits
and shadow banks by leading investors to expect that comparable bailouts will be provided
during future financial disruptions. Assets held by global money market funds increased from
$5.5 trillion to $8.8 trillion between 2008 and 2020, while global repo markets expanded from $6

For discussions of shadow deposits and shadow banks, see Jesse Eisinger, “This Bailout Is Working – for the
Rich,” ProPublica (May 10, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-bailout-is-working-for-the-rich; Financial
Stability Board, Proposals to Enhance Money Market Fund Resilience: Consultation Report (June 30, 2021), at 710, 18-24 [hereinafter 2021 FSB Money Market Fund Report], https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P300621.pdf; 2020 FSB Shadow Banking Report, supra note 21; Jerry Marlatt, “Market Trends:
2020/21 Commercial Paper” Lexis-Nexis Practical Guidance (2021) (noting that 80% of commercial paper issues
have maturities of less than 21 days), available at https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectivesevents/publications/2021/04/market-trends-202021_commercial-paper.pdf; Robin Kaiser-Schatzlein, “The ‘Shadow
Banks’ Are Back, and Still Too Big to Fail,” New Republic (April 27, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/157455/shadow-banks-back-still-big-fail; Zoltan Pozsar et al., “Shadow Banking”
(Fed. Res. Bank of NY Staff Report No. 458, July 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337; Morgan
Ricks, The Money Problem (2016); Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra note 1, at 153-57, 194, 263-64, 28188, 341-44.
35
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trillion to more than $11 trillion. Approximately $1.7 trillion of commercial paper was
outstanding in U.S. and European markets in early 2021, about the same level as in 2009. Total
global assets held by shadow banks that issue short-term deposit substitutes and offer bank-like
credit services have risen from $31.5 trillion in 2008 to $57.1 trillion in 2020.36
Investors are likely to run on money market funds during financial disruptions if fund
managers cannot liquidate STFIs quickly to satisfy redemption demands. In 2008 and 2020,
investor runs occurred at prime money market funds that held bank CDs, commercial paper, and
repos. Markets for those STFIs froze, and many funds could not redeem their shares at their
fixed NAVs. On both occasions, governments and central banks rescued money market funds
and stabilized markets for STFIs.37
After the pandemic crisis subsided in the spring of 2021, big banks pressured many of
their institutional customers to transfer funds from their bank deposit accounts into government
money market funds sponsored by the banks. Big banks strongly encouraged those fund
transfers because their sponsored money market funds do not have to satisfy the capital,
liquidity, and deposit insurance requirements that apply to bank deposits. Government money
market funds channeled much of their inflow of funds from bank deposits into reverse
repurchase agreements with the Fed.38 In June 2021, the Fed increased the interest rate it pays
on reverse repurchase agreements from zero to 0.05%. The Fed raised that rate after mutual fund
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sponsors and investors lobbied the Fed to help government money market funds earn positive
returns on their assets.39
Thus, despite recent proposals for reforms to address the continuing vulnerabilities of
money market funds, big banks and the Fed have supported the continued growth of those funds.
The motivations for big banks are obvious. Persuading customers to transfer their bank deposits
into sponsored money market funds enables the banks to earn management fees from their funds
while reducing their costs of complying with capital, liquidity, and deposit insurance
requirements for deposits. However, it makes no sense for the Fed to support efforts by big
banks to arbitrage prudential rules governing bank deposits. Nor is it wise for the Fed to
encourage the continued growth of shadow deposits by providing “backstops” whenever a
serious liquidity problem occurs.
I have proposed a simple and straightforward remedy to deal with the financial instability
problems caused by shadow deposits. I would compel shadow deposits to become bank deposits
by allowing only federally-insured depository institutions to issue financial instruments that are
payable in practice at par either on demand or within 90 days from the date of their issuance.
Prohibiting nonbanks from issuing short-term financial claims that are payable at par would
dramatically shrink the shadow banking system. Shadow banks could no longer offer depositlike treatment to investors, and they would be compelled to fund their operations with equity
securities or debt obligations that have maturities longer than 90 days. Equity securities and

Colby Smith, “Investors rush to stash cash with Fed after interest rate tweak,” Financial Times (June 17, 2021),
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longer-term debt obligations issued by nonbanks would be subject to a much higher degree of
market scrutiny and a much lower risk of investor runs.40
My proposal would stop financial institutions and investors from evading deposit
insurance rules, bank capital and liquidity standards, and bank reserve requirements by shifting
their funds from bank deposits into lightly-regulated shadow deposits. My proposal would
greatly enhance the ability of bank regulators to monitor and regulate the risks of short-term
financial claims that are payable at par, as those instruments would have to be issued by
federally-insured depository institutions that are subject to close supervision.41
My proposed prohibition against shadow deposits would require all money market funds
that are not issued by federally-insured banks to redeem their shares based on floating NAVs, as
other mutual funds must do. In the absence of deposit-like treatment, most investors would
probably convert their money market funds into bank deposits. The Financial Stability Board
recently acknowledged that prohibiting fixed NAVs for money market funds “would enhance
financial stability, although funding sources for borrowers would become less diverse and more
costly.”42 In view of the enormous costs and market-distorting effects of the 2008 and 2020
bailouts, removing fixed NAVs from money market funds issued by nonbanks would certainly
not be “more costly” for society.
b.

New types of shadow deposits created by fintechs

The dangers posed by shadow deposits have become even greater during the past several
years, as fintechs have created novel types of deposit substitutes. For example, PayPal and its

40
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subsidiary Venmo are state-licensed money transmitters that provide payments services to almost
400 million accounts held by consumers and merchants. At the end of 2020, PayPal’s
organization (including Venmo) held $33 billion of customer balances, compared with $10
billion in 2014 and $22 billion in 2019. PayPal’s customers can withdraw balances held in their
accounts on demand and can also transfer those balances to third parties.43 PayPal acknowledges
that customer balances are unsecured liabilities of PayPal and are not protected by federal
deposit insurance because PayPal is not a chartered bank.44
PayPal’s customer balances are functionally equivalent to bank checking deposits, given
its customers’ ability to withdraw their balances on demand and to transfer their balances to third
parties. Courts could reasonably determine that PayPal is unlawfully engaged in “the business of
receiving deposits” in violation of Section 21(a)(2) of the Glass-Steagall Act. Section 21(a)(2)
prohibits every person other than a regulated and supervised U.S. depository institution from
“engag[ing], to any extent whatsoever . . . in the business of receiving deposits subject to check
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or to repayment upon . . . request of the depositor.”45 In view of Section 21(a)(2)’s prohibition,
PayPal – a nonbank money transmitter – is operating in dangerous territory by accepting and
holding tens of billions of dollars of customer funds that can be withdrawn on demand or
transferred to third parties.
PayPal stands on equally shaky ground in terms of financial stability. In December 2020,
PayPal held reserves consisting of $17.7 billion of short-term investments and $2.8 billion of
long-term investments to back up its $33 billion of customer balances. “Corporate debt
securities” accounted for $7.2 billion of PayPal’s reserves, and “[f]oreign government and
agency securities” represented another $2.8 billion of reserves.46 Given the amount and nature of
its reserves, PayPal would face a very severe liquidity crisis if most of its customers insisted on

45

12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2); see Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra note 1, at 137-39, 153-54, 341, 410 (notes 36
& 37) (discussing the terms and historical background of Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act); United States v.
Jenkins, 943 F.2d 167, 174 (affirming the defendant’s criminal conviction for violating Section 21(a)(2) because the
defendant (an individual) “took custody” of $150,000 on behalf of a purported foreign bank and “agreed to return it
at the will” of the depositor, stating “[y]our money will be here for your use”); In re Thraxton Group, Inc.,
Securities Litigation, 2006 WL 8463540, at *1-*3, *9-*11, *13-*14 (D.S.C., Mar. 20, 2006) (holding that a nonbank
firm violated Section 21(a)(2) by selling $121 million of demand notes to 5,000 investors because the
nonbank “engaged in the business of taking money from investors in return for a promise to return the funds on
demand,” and the “notes were designed to imitate bank certificates of deposit and money market accounts in order to
attract bank depositors to the note program”); see also S & N Equipment Co. v. Casa Grande Cotton Finance Co.,
97 F.3d 337, 340-41, 343-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a nonbank finance company accepted “demand
deposits” for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act because the finance company “accepted funds from its
customers,” placed those funds in “credit accounts,” and allowed customers to “withdraw funds as needed” and
transfer funds to third parties).
Howell Jackson and Morgan Ricks have called on federal agencies to clarify the “requirements for supervision and
regulation” that institutions must satisfy to accept “deposits” under Section 21(a)(2). They have also suggested that
companies like PayPal, which are state-regulated money transmitters and are also regulated by FinCen for
compliance with money laundering laws, might qualify as institutions that can accept “deposits” under Section
21(a)(2). Howell E. Jackson & Morgan Ricks, “Locating Stablecoins within the Regulatory Perimeter,” Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Aug. 5, 2021) (note 13),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/05/locating-stablecoins-within-the-regulatory-perimeter/. I respectfully
disagree with that suggestion. PayPal’s current regulatory regime is not equivalent to bank regulation and
supervision in any meaningful sense, and it therefore does not comport with the statutory terms and purpose of
Section 21(a)(2). PayPal’s regulatory regime is plainly inadequate to prevent PayPal from creating unacceptable
risks to financial stability by issuing large volumes of run-prone, short-term financial claims that promise depositlike treatment but are subject to severe liquidity risks. To avoid any room for doubt, Congress should amend
Section 21(a)(2) to make clear that only federally-insured depository institutions are allowed to accept “deposits.”
46
2020 PayPal 10-K Report, supra note 43, at 4-13, 53-54, 59, 67-68, 70, 86 (quotes).

24

withdrawing their balances quickly. In February 2020, Fed Governor Lael Brainard warned that
the “nonbank money” sitting in PayPal’s customer balances was “not insured directly by the
FDIC, and consumers may be at risk that the issuer will not be able to honor its liabilities.”47
Fintechs have produced another new category of shadow deposits called “stablecoins.” A
stablecoin is a cryptocurrency that purports to have a “stable” value because it is “backed” by
sovereign currencies or other financial assets that appear to have a high degree of safety and
liquidity. Stablecoins are the leading form of payment for trades executed on cryptocurrency
exchanges. Traders in cryptocurrencies view stablecoins as “a vital tool, because of the speed
with which [stablecoins] can be used to move money from one crypto exchange to another, and
because they provide a handy way to park cash temporarily.”48 Stablecoins are “a central part of
cryptocurrency trading in a similar way [that] money market funds are used by typical
investors.”49
The two most widely-used stablecoins are Tether (used in almost half of the $1 trillion of
stablecoin transactions completed during the first quarter of 2021) and USD Coin (used in more
than a quarter of those transactions). Tether was launched in 2014, while USD Coin and eight
other widely-used stablecoins were started in 2018 or later. Four-fifths of the stablecoins
launched before 2016 later collapsed, as have a quarter of stablecoins that began to operate in
2018.50
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The amount of outstanding stablecoins has grown rapidly and currently exceeds $110
billion, due to surging trading volumes on cryptocurrency exchanges. The declared value of
Tethers in circulation rose from $4 billion in December 2019 to $20 billion a year later and $63
billion in June 2021. The stated value of USD Coins in circulation increased from $1 billion in
June 2020 to more than $25 billion a year later.51 Stablecoins provide “a key source of liquidity
in the crypto markets,” but there are serious questions about their “associated risks, primarily
revolving around the composition of the reserves backing them.”52
Tether, the largest stablecoin, has become “the de facto reserve currency of the global
crypto economy” because it serves as a “dollar-like token of exchange, without the hassle and the
risks of using real dollars.” The same executives who own Tether also control Bitfinex, a
leading cryptocurrency exchange and a “key venue” for “price discovery” in crypto markets.53
Tether and Bitfinex are both incorporated in the “famously opaque British Virgin Islands.”54 A
recent academic study concluded that top officials of Bitfinex issued large volumes of Tether
tokens without reserves between March 2017 and March 2018 and used those tokens to boost
Bitcoin’s price by purchasing Bitcoins on Bitfinex and other cryptocurrency exchanges.55
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Tether originally claimed that “[e]very tether is always backed 1-to-1, by traditional
[dollar] currency held in our reserves.” Tether abandoned that claim in March 2019 and instead
stated that its stablecoins were “always 100 percent backed by our reserves, which include
traditional currency and cash equivalents and, from time to time, may include other assets and
receivables from loans made by Tether to third parties, which may include affiliated
entities.”56
New York Attorney General (NYAG) Letitia James filed an antifraud lawsuit against
Tether and Bitfinex in April 2019. NYAG James alleged that Tether misrepresented the amount
and nature of its reserves and also concealed the loss of $850 million of customer funds caused
by the malfeasance of a third-party payment processor. In February 2021, Tether and Bitfinex
entered into a settlement agreement with NYAG James. Tether and Bitfinex agreed to pay a fine
of $18.5 million, to publish quarterly reports for two years about Tether’s reserves, and to stop
trading with New York residents.57
In May 2021, Tether published its first required quarterly report about its reserves.
According to that report, only a quarter of Tether’s reserves consisted of cash, cash equivalents,
and short-term deposits on March 31, 2021. Commercial paper accounted for half of Tether’s
reserves, and most of its remaining reserves were secured loans and corporate bonds. As one
analyst observed, “Tether’s [reserve] assets are made up mainly of long and short-term corporate
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debt. . . . And we have no idea of who the borrowers are, except that long-term loans are not
made to Tether’s ‘affiliates’.”58
USD Coin, the second largest stablecoin, followed Tether’s example by abandoning its
earlier claim that all of its outstanding tokens were backed by federally-insured deposit accounts
at U.S. depository institutions. Since April 2020, Circle (the issuer of USD Coins) has published
reports stating that USD Coins are backed by “total balances in accounts held by the Company at
federally insured US depository institutions and in approved investments.”59 In May 2021,
Circle said its “approved investments” included “cash, cash equivalents, and short-duration
investment-grade assets,” but Circle did not provide further details about those assets.60 It
therefore appears that Circle’s reserves for USD Coins, like Tether’s reserves, include significant
amounts of commercial paper and other private-sector debt obligations.
Fed Governor Lael Brainard has warned that stablecoins pose “consumer protection and
financial stability risks because of their potential volatility and the risk of run-like behavior.”
Many analysts believe that a run by investors on leading stablecoins like Tether and USD Coin
would threaten the viability of cryptocurrency markets, as stablecoins are the primary method of
settling trades on those markets. In addition, Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Gary
Gensler has criticized stablecoins for enabling traders in cryptocurrencies “to sidestep a host of
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public policy goals connected to our traditional banking and financial system: anti-money
laundering, tax compliance, sanctions, and the like.”61
Prime money market funds, PayPal’s customer balances, and stablecoins are highly
unstable and run-prone shadow deposits. Their customers are encouraged to believe that they are
purchasing safe and “stable” substitutes for FDIC-insured bank deposits. In sharp contrast to
federally-insured bank deposits, all three types of shadow deposits are “private money” that is
not backed by the full faith and credit of any sovereign. Their reserves consist primarily of
private-sector debt obligations that are likely to become illiquid and unsaleable (except at steeply
discounted prices) during financial disruptions.
Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren highlighted the dangerous similarities between
stablecoins and prime money market funds during an interview with Brian Cheung of Yahoo
Finance in June 2021. Rosengren said that Tether’s “portfolio” of reserves “looks like a
portfolio of a prime money market fund but maybe riskier.” Rosengren emphasized that “it's not
just money market funds that we have to be worried about,” and he warned that the “exponential
growth in stablecoin” could “destabilize short term credit markets.”62
Cheung commented that “the Fed did step in during the midst of this pandemic to
backstop the corporate debt market and commercial paper markets,” and he therefore asked
whether “the financial stability risk of those stablecoins like tether is only as big . . . as the Fed
will allow given its historical role as a back stopper?” Rosengren responded by stating his hope
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that “we would change the regulations so that the next time we have a crisis, we don't have to do
it again.”63
Cheung’s question and Rosengren’s response underscored the severe financial instability
risks and market distortions created by money market funds, stablecoins, and other shadow
deposits. Cheung’s question reflected the general expectation among financial institutions and
investors that the Fed would continue to “backstop” shadow deposits to prevent destabilizing
runs by holders of those instruments. Rosengren’s answer signaled his awareness that further
bailouts of shadow deposits would harm the public interest by further eroding market discipline
and distorting prices in short-term wholesale credit markets.
In December 2020, three members of Congress introduced a bill called the “STABLE
Act.” The STABLE Act would prohibit the issuance of stablecoins by any person other than
FDIC-insured depository institutions. It would also require FDIC-insured institutions to obtain
prior regulatory approval before issuing stablecoins. Howell Jackson and Morgan Ricks have
proposed that stablecoins should be treated as “deposits” under Section 21(a)(2) of the GlassSteagall Act, thereby prohibiting the issuance of stablecoins by entities other than regulated
depository institutions.64 To ensure the stability of our financial system, Congress should amend
Section 21(a)(2) to make clear that only federally-insured depository institutions are authorized
to issue money market funds, stablecoins, and other short-term financial claims that are
functionally equivalent to bank deposits.
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4.

Bailouts during the GFC and the pandemic crisis have confirmed the TBTF status
of universal banks and large shadow banks
During the GFC, the U.S., the U.K., and other European nations arranged enormous

bailouts of large universal banks and systemically important shadow banks (including securities
broker-dealers and insurance companies). In November 2009, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke told the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) that all of the thirteen largest U.S. financial
institutions except one (presumably JPMorgan Chase) would probably have failed during the
GFC without the financial assistance they received from federal agencies. A month later, New
York Fed President Timothy Geithner told the FCIC that “none of [the biggest banks] would
have survived a situation in which we had let that fire try to burn itself out.” Lehman Brothers
and Washington Mutual were the only U.S. financial firms with over $100 billion of assets that
collapsed into bankruptcy during the GFC. The federal government’s bailouts ensured that there
would be “no more Lehmans or WaMus” after the end of September 2008.65
Similarly, the U.K. and other EU governments provided financial aid to more than 110
banks – including 12 of the 20 largest EU banks – and over 100 nonbank financial institutions.66
The rescues arranged by the U.S., U.K., and other EU governments fulfilled a pledge made by
finance ministers of the Group of 7 nations (G7) on October 10, 2008. The G7 ministers stated
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that their countries would “take decisive steps and use all available tools to support systemically
important financial institutions and prevent their failure.” On February 23, 2009, U.S. bank
regulators reiterated that pledge by declaring that the federal government would “preserve the
viability of systemically important financial institutions.”67 The bailouts that occurred on both
sides of the Atlantic during the GFC established beyond any doubt that big universal banks and
systemically important shadow banks were TBTF.
The pandemic crisis has not yet forced the U.S., U.K., and EU to recapitalize large
financial institutions. U.S. and international bank regulators have said that the lack of failures
among global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) shows that big banks are “more resilient”
by virtue of the stronger capital and liquidity requirements established by G20 nations after
2009. However, regulators have also acknowledged that megabanks “benefited from the
extraordinary policy measures and other supervisory and regulatory relief” that government
authorities provided.68 Governments on both sides of the Atlantic provided crucial support to
large banks during 2020 when they rescued short-term wholesale credit markets, gave huge
amounts of financial assistance to households and business firms, and backstopped the corporate
and municipal bond markets.69
The G20’s post-crisis reforms required G-SIBs to maintain substantially higher levels of
capital and liquidity reserves, compared with the woefully inadequate amounts they held when
the GFC began in 2007. Average capital and liquidity levels for G-SIBs increased steadily
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between 2012 and 2017. However, capital and liquidity levels stopped rising in 2017 and
remained about the same through 2019. At the end of 2019, the Basel III supplemental leverage
capital ratio for the largest global banks – widely viewed as the most binding capital standard –
averaged 6.4% for U.S. G-SIBs, 4.9% for European and Canadian G-SIBs, and 6.9% for Asian
G-SIBs.70 Those ratios were far below the 15% leverage capital ratio that officials at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and other experts have advocated as the minimum level needed to
establish a truly resilient banking system that does not require frequent government bailouts.71
The pandemic crisis posed very severe challenges to the survival of universal banks and
shadow banks until governments and central banks intervened. On March 16, 2020, the U.S.
stock market’s main indexes fell by 12% or more in the market’s worst performance since the
stock market crash on October 19, 1987. Bank stocks were “among the hardest hit,” and the
stock prices of the three largest U.S. banks dropped by 15% or more. Short-term wholesale
credit markets froze, and investor runs began against money market funds. The pandemic crisis
“brought the financial crisis to the brink,” and “the stresses to the financial system [on March 16]
were broader than many had seen,” even during the GFC.72
The federal government “unleashed a barrage of government programs [to pull] the
system back from collapse.” The Fed provided over $50 billion of discount window loans to
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banks, and it quickly reactivated almost all of the emergency lending facilities it used during the
GFC to support large financial institutions and short-term wholesale financial markets. The Fed
used its restored facilities to provide $35 billion of loans to securities broker-dealers (many of
which were affiliates of universal banks), $440 billion of repo loans, $66 billion of assistance to
money market funds and the commercial paper market, and over $460 billion of swap loans to
foreign central banks (thereby indirectly providing dollar funding needed by foreign banks).73
The Fed also conducted “a torrent of bond buying programs to stabilize markets.” The
Fed purchased huge volumes of Treasury bonds and federal agency securities and added $2.85
trillion to its balance sheet between March 11 and June 10, 2020. Congress, the Treasury and the
Fed created new lending and bond-buying programs that provided large-scale financial
assistance to households, small businesses, and large corporations.74 Thus, large banks “escaped
bailouts [during the pandemic] primarily because their customers were bailed out instead.”75
Universal banks and shadow banks would have suffered very large losses if federal
agencies had not intervened. On March 15, 2020 – the day before the stock market crashed – all
eight U.S. G-SIBs issued a joint press release announcing that they were facing an
“unprecedented challenge” from the pandemic and were therefore suspending further stock
buybacks.76 Universal banks and shadow banks benefited greatly from the Fed’s quick actions to
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rescue money market funds, repos, and the commercial paper market because they relied
significantly on funding from all three sources.77
Even with the federal government’s massive support, stock prices for U.S. G-SIBs
performed “notably worse than the S&P 500 index” between March and June 2020. A widelyused stock price index for 24 large U.S. banks (including six of the eight U.S. G-SIBs) dropped
by 40% between January and May 2020, compared to a 13% decline for the broad Russell 3000
index. Risk spreads for credit default swaps issued by the six largest U.S. G-SIBs rose
significantly during the spring of 2020, although they did not reach the levels recorded in 2008.78
In June 2020, the Fed conducted a stress test of the 34 largest domestic and foreign
banks operating in the U.S. The Fed estimated – based on alternative scenarios reflecting
differing degrees of severity for the pandemic’s impact – that the stress-tested banks could suffer
total losses of $560 billion to $700 billion over the next nine calendar quarters. The Fed’s stress
test also determined that capital ratios for “several” banks would fall close to their “minimum
capital requirements.”79 A contemporaneous stress test performed by four Harvard economists
(including former Fed Governor Jeremy Stein) estimated that the 21 largest U.S. banks could
suffer losses of $390 billion to $550 billion during the same period, and four or five U.S. G-SIBs
might fall below their minimum capital requirements.80 Thus, both stress tests indicated that
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major U.S. banks faced very serious potential threats in mid-2020, even with the extensive help
they received from the federal government.
Large banks in other advanced economies also experienced severe financial stress during
2020, as indicated by widespread downgrades in their credit ratings and significantly higher risk
spreads for their bonds. In October 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) performed a
“global stress test” of 350 large banks in 29 countries with advanced banking systems. The IMF
estimated – based on alternative scenarios for the pandemic’s potential impact – that total capital
levels for the stress-tested banks would fall $110 billion to $220 billion below their combined
minimum capital requirements, even after accounting for the vast support they received from
governments and central banks.81 All three of the foregoing stress tests assumed that current
Basel III capital standards are sufficient to assure the resilience of large banks – an assumption
that many experts have challenged, as indicated above.
Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari recently stated that “[f]iscal authorities were
right to be so forceful and proactive in supporting the economy during the Covid downturn.” He
emphasized that “this was also a banking bailout. Absent these fiscal interventions, losses in the
banking sector would have been much larger.”82 A recent New York Fed staff study concluded
that implicit government subsidies for systemically important banks around the world became
significantly larger during the pandemic crisis as a result of “unprecedented government
support.”83 Thus, the enormous rescue programs established by governments and central banks
during the pandemic entrenched the TBTF status of large universal banks.
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Private equity firms also benefited greatly from those rescue programs. Private equity
firms are among the most significant shadow banks, and they managed $4 trillion of assets at the
beginning of 2020. Several of the largest private equity firms became financial conglomerates
after the GFC by establishing broker-dealer subsidiaries and by acquiring insurance companies.
Private equity firms have used their broader resources to finance corporate buyouts by
underwriting syndicated leveraged loans and high-yield bonds. Today’s leading private equity
firms compete directly with universal banks, and they strongly resemble the “Big Five” securities
broker-dealers that were major players on Wall Street when the GFC began in 2007. The largest
private equity firms essentially replaced the “Big Five” broker-dealers after those institutions
either failed, were acquired by universal banks, or became universal banks themselves during
2008.84
Private equity firms arranged corporate buyouts valued at more than $3 trillion
worldwide between 2010 and 2019. Most of those buyouts were highly leveraged transactions
that left acquired firms with heavy debt burdens. Consequently, many of the 35,000 U.S.
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companies controlled by private equity firms in early 2020 faced a high risk of failure after the
pandemic crisis began.85
The four largest private equity firms – Apollo, Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR – reported
large losses during March and April 2020, and their market values plummeted.86 Credit ratings
agencies downgraded almost $1 trillion of U.S. corporate debts during that period. Even after
the Fed’s early interventions in March, markets for leveraged loans and noninvestment-grade
(junk) bonds remained virtually frozen. Many heavily indebted companies could not pay or
refinance their debts. Private equity firms appeared to be “facing a year of reckoning,” as their
“often highly-leveraged portfolio companies confronted the worst economic outlook since the
Great Depression.”87
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Private equity firms and their allies aggressively lobbied the federal government to help
their endangered portfolio companies. On April 9, 2020, the Fed agreed to expand its programs
for buying corporate bonds and bond ETFs to include bonds and leveraged loans issued by
companies whose credit ratings had been downgraded to noninvestment grade (junk) since the
pandemic’s outbreak. The Fed’s expansion of its corporate bond programs “provided a lifeline
to corporate debt rated below investment grade” and ensured that private equity firms would
have “continued access to cheap credit for new deals.” Many observers viewed the Fed’s action
as “an indirect bailout of the private equity industry.”88
In addition, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic allowed companies controlled by
private equity firms to receive government-guaranteed pandemic loans. Generous support from
governments and central banks enabled the private equity industry to recover rapidly during the
second half of 2020. Private equity firms arranged worldwide buyouts valued at $560 billion in
2020 – the highest level since 2007 – and they arranged another $500 billion of such deals during
the first half of 2021.89 Rescue programs during the pandemic crisis thus affirmed the TBTF
status of large shadow banks as well as universal banks.90
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5.

Bailouts during the pandemic crisis perpetuate the global doom loop, which creates
great dangers for the financial system, general economy, and society.
The pandemic crisis confirms that governments, central banks, universal banks, shadow

banks, and wealthy investors remain trapped in a global doom loop of toxic mutual dependence.
Whenever a serious economic or financial disruption occurs, governments and central banks
arrange huge bailouts to prevent disorderly failures of universal banks and systemically
important shadow banks. Central banks maintain unconventional monetary policies that keep
interest rates low, boost asset prices, and facilitate the continued growth of public and private
debts. Universal banks and shadow banks eagerly underwrite higher levels of private and public
debts, given the lucrative fees they earn from such transactions. Wealthy investors buy higherrisk financial assets in a “search for yield,” based on their expectation that governments and
central banks will take all necessary steps to preserve economic and financial stability.91
As shown above, the global doom loop has produced an infernal cycle of ever-increasing
public and private debts and ever-larger bailouts. From December 2007 through March 2021 – a
period that included immense government rescue programs during the GFC and the pandemic
crisis – total U.S. public and private debts increased from $53.8 trillion to $83.9 trillion. The
federal government’s rapidly growing debt burden accounted for over 60% of that increase,
rising from $9.2 trillion (63% of U.S. GDP) in December 2007 to $28.1 trillion (127% of U.S.
GDP) in March 2021.92 Similarly, global public and private debts expanded from $167 trillion in
December 2007 to $289 trillion in March 2021. Rising worldwide government debts accounted
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for 40% of that increase, growing from $34.8 trillion (60% of global GDP) in 2007 to $83.4
trillion (106.5% of global GDP) in 2021.93
The global doom loop creates unsustainable risks and burdens for the financial system,
the broader economy, and society. In July 2021, a U.K. House of Lords committee issued a
report criticizing the quantitative easing (QE) policy of the Bank of England (BoE).94 QE
policies are a central component of the global doom loop, as they enable central banks to buy
huge volumes of government debt securities and other financial assets, thereby supporting the
growth and reducing the debt service costs of public and private borrowings. The House of
Lords committee identified five very troubling features of QE policies.
First, the committee pointed out that “[n]o central bank has managed successfully to
reverse quantitative easing over the medium to long term.” The Bank of Japan (BoJ) was the
first central bank to adopt a QE policy in 2001, and the BoJ has never exited that policy after
buying almost $7 trillion of government bonds and other financial assets. The Fed tried to
unwind its QE policy in 2013 and again in 2017-18, but the Fed abandoned both attempts after
they triggered disruptive selloffs by frightened investors in global financial markets. The House
of Lords committee warned that “central banks are facing a ‘no-exit paradigm’ from
quantitative easing. . . . [T]he scale of quantitative easing has been increased repeatedly. . . .
This has only served to exacerbate the challenges involved in unwinding the policy.”95

93

2021 IIF Global Debt Monitor, supra note 29; Wadhwa, supra note 27; Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra
note 1, at 321-22 & Figure 12.1.
94
Quantitative easing; a dangerous addiction? (U.K. House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, July 16, 2021)
(1 Report of Session 2019-21, HL Paper 42) [hereinafter 2021 House of Lords QE Report],
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5802/ldselect/ldeconaf/42/4202.htm.
95
Id., Summary (first quote), Chapter 1 (¶¶ 8-10 & Figure 2), Chapter 4 (¶¶ 160, 164-65 & 177 (first part of second
quote) (emphasis in original)) & Chapter 5 (¶ 180) (remainder of second quote) (emphasis in original)); see also
Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra note 1, at 321-27 (discussing the inability of central banks to exit their QE
policies); Leonard, supra note 26 (same).

41

Michael Forsyth, the committee’s chair, expressed his concern that “[t]he Bank of England has
become addicted to quantitative easing.”96
Second, the committee stated that the BoE’s QE program may have violated the BoE’s
mandate by “effectively monetizing the government deficit.”97 During the pandemic crisis, the
BoE doubled the size of its balance sheet by authorizing the purchases of £450 billion of U.K.
government bonds. The BoE’s purchases of government bonds “aligned closely” with the
volume and timing of government bond issues made by the U.K. Treasury during the crisis.
Most of the 18 largest investors in U.K. government bonds and several analysts concluded that
“the Bank of England had bought gilts to keep the Government’s borrowing costs down.” The
House of Lords committee determined that there was a “widespread perception . . . that
financing the Government’s deficit spending was a significant reason for quantitative
easing during the COVID-19 pandemic.”98
Third, the committee was alarmed by QE’s potential to undermine the BoE’s political
independence as well as the credibility of the BoE’s mandate to control inflation and maintain
stable prices. The committee stated that QE has “made Bank of England and HM Treasury
policymaking more interdependent, blurring monetary and fiscal policy, and this has
started to erode the perception that the Bank has acted wholly independently of political
considerations.” Some experts stated that the BoE faced strong political pressure to keep
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interest rates low for an extended period to suppress government borrowing costs, thereby
weakening the BoE’s ability to respond to significant increases in inflation. The committee
warned that “if inflation rises, the Bank may come under political pressure to not raise
interest rates to control inflation because the risk to the public finances and debt
sustainability would have increased significantly.”99
Fourth, the committee found that “quantitative easing has distributional outcomes that
exacerbate wealth inequalities” because the BoE’s ultra-low interest rates and large infusions
of liquidity boosted market prices for housing and higher-risk financial investments, which are
primarily owned by the richest households. In the committee’s view, QE “benefited wealthy
asset holders disproportionately by artificially inflating asset prices. On balance, we
conclude that the evidence shows that quantitative easing has exacerbated wealth
inequalities.”100
Finally, the House of Lords committee expressed its concern that QE could “compromise
financial stability” by encouraging “excessive and potentially destabilising risk-taking in
markets.” Mohamed El-Erian told the committee that “consistent central bank intervention
through quantitative easing” encouraged market participants to “take excessive risks in the
knowledge that central banks will provide support if financial stability is threatened.” Lee
Bucheit stated that “the normal risk aversion of private sector lenders has been anaesthetised by
the fact that they are stuffed [by central banks] with liquidity that they must re-deploy.”101 The
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committee’s chair, Lord Forsyth, concluded that QE presents “a serious danger to the long-term
health of the public finances.”102
The disturbing problems identified by the House of Lords committee with regard to the
BoE’s QE policy apply equally to the unconventional monetary policies of the Fed and other
leading central banks. As the committee pointed out, no major central bank has successfully
exited from QE. Due to the close coordination between government deficit spending on stimulus
programs and central bank purchases of government bonds, some analysts believe that QE
policies have effectively monetized the growth of government debt.103 The BoE’s purchases of
£450 billion of U.K. government bonds since March 2020 have nearly matched the £486 billion
of bonds issued by the U.K. government to finance its response to the pandemic.104
The Fed bought $2.44 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities between March 2020 and March
2021, equal to half of the $4.91 increase in federal debt during that period. The Fed’s purchases
nearly doubled its percentage ownership of outstanding federal debt from 9.3% to 17.6%,
making it “the biggest player in the US bond market.”105 Some observers have concluded that
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QE programs are a form of “financial repression,” which is designed to suppress interest rates on
government bonds and thereby reduce government borrowing and debt service costs.106
Considerable evidence also supports the House of Lords committee’s view that
unconventional monetary policies since 2008 have increased wealth inequality and encouraged
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions and investors. The ultra-low interest rate policies
and QE programs of central banks have (i) greatly reduced the returns to ordinary savers from
bank deposits and other low-risk investments, (ii) encouraged investors to buy higher-risk,
higher-yielding investments, and (iii) increased the market values of housing and other higherrisk assets, resulting in disproportionate wealth gains for the richest households, which own the
largest share of those assets. Government rescues of financial institutions, financial markets, and
wealthy investors during the GFC and the pandemic have further increased the incentives and
payoffs for high-risk, high-reward investment strategies. Statistical indicators of wealth
inequality have risen substantially since 2008 and accelerated during the pandemic.107
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In addition to helping wealthy investors, central banks “pick[ed] winners and losers”
among private-sector companies when they selected the recipients of their corporate bondbuying and corporate lending programs during 2020. Both forms of favoritism could turn public
opinion against central banks. The Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party movements reflected a
widely-shared view that the Fed bailed out Wall Street banks and influential investors during the
GFC. The rise of a similar popular consensus that the Fed rescued powerful financial
institutions, big corporations, and wealthy investors during the pandemic could further erode
public support for the Fed.108
An additional threat to the political independence of central banks arises out of the close
coordination between central bank bond-buying programs and government fiscal stimulus efforts
during the pandemic. The Fed, the BoE, and the ECB have maintained ultra-low interest rates
and QE policies and have expressed their willingness to allow inflation rates to exceed 2% for
extended periods of time.109 The heads of Belgium’s and Germany’s central banks recently
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criticized the ECB for continuing to buy large amounts of EU government bonds to “cap
borrowing costs” for those governments. The Belgian central bank chief warned that the ECB
was losing its political independence as it became subject to the “fiscal dominance” of EU
governments.110
The Fed announced in July 2021 that it would maintain near-zero interest rates and
continue to buy $120 billion of Treasury securities and federal agency mortgage-backed
securities each month until the U.S. economy achieved “substantial further progress . . . toward
its maximum employment and price stability goals.” Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated that the
Fed would consider whether to “taper” its bond purchases at future meetings, but he “offered few
specifics.” He also indicated that the Fed was “nowhere near considering plans to raise interest
rates,” and he reiterated “his longstanding view that recent surges in inflation are likely to fade
over time.”111 Powell’s positions on monetary policy during the pandemic have been “in
lockstep with the White House.” It seems highly unlikely that he would be appointed or
confirmed for another term as Chair in 2022 if he advocated a significant change in the Fed’s
“highly accommodative, dovish response to the pandemic.”112
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As the House of Lords committee warned, the apparent erosion of political independence
for central banks could severely weaken their ability to control inflation. The Fed, the BoE, and
other central banks lost much of their independence and credibility during the 1960s and 1970s,
when they adopted easy-money policies that supported extensive deficit spending by their
governments and failed to prevent high inflation rates.113 Today there are growing concerns that
(1) huge government deficits and extraordinary monetary stimulus by central banks could
produce significant increases in inflation, and (2) political pressures on central banks will prevent
them from responding effectively to rising inflation rates.114 The potential threat of high
inflation should not be disregarded, as past inflationary episodes have frequently led to deep
recessions with heavy losses for societies. Periods of high inflation and severe recessions are
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very likely to increase social inequality, as they inflict the greatest harm on wage earners,
recipients of fixed pensions, and lower- and middle-class households.115
An even greater potential danger is that escalating private and public debts could cause
another systemic debt crisis comparable to 2008 and 2020, but with even worse results. During
severe financial crises, as shown by Europe’s experiences during the Great Depression and Great
Recession, heavily indebted governments often lack sufficient credibility to borrow the funds
needed to stabilize their financial systems. In that event, private-sector financial crises rapidly
become sovereign debt crises, and governments have to choose between defaulting on their debts
explicitly (through debt repudiations, moratoria, or restructuring) or implicitly (through currency
devaluations or rapid inflation). The Eurozone barely avoided such a disastrous outcome during
the Great Recession.116 In view of the colossal debt burdens that governments and central banks
now carry, it is far from clear whether the next major debt crisis would have an equally benign
conclusion.117
Conclusion
The pandemic financial crisis confirms that policymakers have failed to address the root
causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. The global doom loop remains in place, as
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universal banks and shadow banks continue to take speculative risks and to underwrite escalating
levels of private and public debts in reliance on explicit and implicit support from governments
and central banks. Our fragile, risky, and unstable financial system collapsed in 2008 and
became paralyzed in 2020, forcing governments and central banks to arrange huge bailouts.
Those bailouts “bankified” global financial markets by expanding government safety nets to
encompass short-term wholesale credit markets, systemically important shadow banks, and (in
2020) a wide array of business firms. Both bailouts also imposed enormous financial burdens on
governments and central banks, raising serious questions about their ability to cope with the next
systemic crisis.
Our failure-prone financial system is unsustainable and must be fundamentally reformed.
As Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari observed in September 2020, “what kind of absurd
financial system do we have that requires the central bank to bail it out every decade? . . . Is
betting on successful future bailouts a sensible risk for [investors]? I would argue the answer is a
resounding no.”118
In my recent book, I proposed a series of reforms that would end the global doom loop
and create a more stable, resilient, and competitive financial system. The most significant
reform would be a new Glass-Steagall Act, which would separate banks from the capital markets
and prohibit nonbanks from issuing functional substitutes for bank deposits. Another very
important reform would require banks to fund a much higher percentage of their operations with
equity capital instead of debt.119
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A new Glass-Steagall Act would break up universal banks and shadow banks, thereby
ending their toxic conflicts of interest, excessive risk-taking, and dangerous influence over
regulators and politicians. It would create strong structural risk buffers and greatly reduce the
probability that financial disruptions would spread across the newly-separated sectors of
banking, insurance, and capital markets. It would permit governments and central banks to
ensure the stability of the commercial banking system without being forced to provide openended guarantees and bailouts for the entire financial system. A new Glass-Steagall Act would
discourage excessive growth in private debts during economic expansions and avoid the need for
huge increases in government debts to finance massive bailouts during economic downturns. It
would therefore provide the most direct and practical approach for ending the global doom loop
and stopping the destructive boom-and-bust cycles of the past quarter century.120
We should also endeavor to reduce private-sector debts by repealing tax laws that
encourage debt financing by business firms. For example, we should eliminate the tax code’s
current deduction for interest paid on corporate debt, thereby providing equal tax treatment for
interest paid to debtholders and dividends paid to stockholders. We should also end the “carried
interest tax advantage,” which encourages leveraged buyouts by allowing private equity
managers to pay taxes on their earnings at low capital gains rates instead of higher personal
income rates.121 Removing artificial tax advantages for debt financing would encourage business
firms to fund a larger percentage of their operations with equity capital, thereby producing a
stronger and more resilient business sector.
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